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PREFACE
The method of optimizing the effectiveness of an "overall weapons
system" and the concept of an overall system in this paper, stemmed from
work carried on at the Military Operations Research Group of Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation during the 1953 summer field trip. The models and
examples used reflect operational and combat experience in the recon-
naissance field as closely as feasibility of solution and security will
allow.
The writer would like to express his appreciation to Associate
Professor S.H. Kalmbach and Professor C.C. Torrance of the United States
Naval Postgraduate School staff for their help as advisors and to R.A.
Bailey and H.P. Gruner, Jr. of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for their
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TABLE OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Mjjj the class of all missions
Ww the class of all weapons sub-systems
Lr the class of all reconnaissance sub-systems
Nn the class of all targets
Z all values of information deterioration
z
R all responses of decisioner
Pj£ probability of a kill by overall weapons system per action
P
c
probability of a contact of n by w
P^IC probability of a kill of n by w given a contact
C cost of weapons sub-system per action
Nw ratio of weapons sub-system actions to reconnaissance sub-
L system actions
C, cost of reconnaissance sub-system per action
C. cost of decision per action of w
C
c
cost of communications per action of w__




M. mean value of target distribution
or" variance of target distribution
a~~ standard deviation of target distribution
D diffusion constant
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This paper defines an "overall weapons system" as any combination
of a weapons sub-system, a reconnaissance sub-system and a decision mak-
ing component joined by a communications net. This definition is shown
to cover the entire range of military striking forces.
A general measure of "overall weapons system" effectiveness is de-
fined in terms of kills per cost. A variable Z, information deteriora-
tion, which is a function of time, for a given "overall weapons system"
and operating situation is also defined. The kill probability and the
cost of the "overall weapons system", in the given operating situation,
are both shown to be dependent upon Z, information deterioration. Kill
probability and cost both increase as information deterioration is de-
creased. By finding kill probability and "overall weapons system" cost
as functions of information deterioration when the reconnaissance sub-
system is varied, the value of information deterioration corresponding
to maximum effectiveness defines an optimal reconnaissance sub-system.
Similarly, proposed "overall weapons systems" may be tested against
various operating situations to determine conditions under which each
may be profitably used.
A carrier task force with attack aircraft and photographic recon-
naissance is developed as an example (with assumed data) to show how
the details of solution are worked out.
The appendix includes work on photographic sweep rates.

2. Statement of the problem
Operations Research studies of weapons systems have seldom con-
sidered the effect of intelligence, and especially reconnaissance, on
the effectiveness of the "overall weapons system" of which a weapon is
the major sub-system.
Though it is possible to conceive of an "overall weapons system" in
which a reconnaissance sub-system is not important, this is not the usual
case.
It is the purpose of this paper to define the "overall weapons sys-
tem", to derive a measure of effectiveness for the "overall weapons sys-
tem", and to suggest a method of optimizing the effectiveness of the
"overall weapons system" with respect to its reconnaissance sub-system.
3. The "Overall Weapons System"
In the armed services a weapons system is the means to carry out a
combat mission. Generally in steady state combat operations, a mission
as transmitted to the operating forces contains little uncertainty as to
the nature of enemy forces. The operating forces are aware of their own
weapons capabilities. There usually exists, however, some uncertainty as
to the location and identity of a military objective or its components.
It is this location uncertainty that makes necessary the concept of an
"overall weapons system" within which a reconnaissance sub-system, a
decision mechanism and a communications net have been integrated with a
weapon. We have assumed that such information as own equipment charac-
teristics and enemy target characteristics are supplied by other means
than the reconnaissance sub-system. Obviously this assumption is not










































































































Structure Providing Inputs to "overall weapons system"
5

information concerning enemy weapons characteristics or enemy strategy
and tactics as a bonus, and will assume that a reconnaissance sub-system
exists primarily to reduce the uncertainty of target locations and thereby
to increase the probability that a weapons sub-system will engage a target.
When we introduce uncertainty of object location, it is necessary to
expand the scope of our systems analysis. We must include a decisioner,
a reconnaissance sub-system and a communications net as well as the weapons
sub-system itself. The decisioner chooses between using or not using the
weapons sub-system against targets located by the reconnaissance sub-sys-
tem. We will define an "overall weapons system" as the military system
formed by integrating a weapons sub-system, a reconnaissance sub-system,
and a decision mechanism all joined by a communications net. This overall
system is able to gather and receive intelligence and react logically to
it.
Illustration 1 shows qualitatively how inputs to the decisioner from a
higher military level, represented by the broad arrow, and from the recon-
naissance sub-system are combined and result in orders to the reconnais-
sance and weapons sub-systems.
In illustration 2, symbols representing inputs and outputs are assigned.
The relationship shown in illustrations 1 and 2 can be extended up
the national chain of command as shown in illustration 3. At each superior
level the inputs to the decisioner are the same. They are:
(a) Mission
(b) Weapons sub-system characteristics




(e) Uncertainty of location of military objectives
However, the scope of each input is broader at each higher level.
Here we note that information which is gathered at the operating level
has a large influence upon the decisions made there, and a smaller ef-
fect on decisions made by the next echelon. This effect at the higher
level is reflected back down to the operating force through the responses
of its decision mechanism. These responses appear as inputs to the opera-
ting level. So the effects of information continue to be felt up and
down the command pyramid, but diminishing rapidly as levels removed from
the operating forces are reached.

CHAPTER II
OPTIMAL "OVERALL WEAPONS SYSTEM" RESPONSES
!• Simplification of "overall weapons system"
Decisions of the "overall weapons system", as outlined in Chapter I,
are affected by both the upward flow of information and the downward
flow of information and decisions, phrased as missions. The effect of
these interactions appears ultimately as a change of mission at the operat-
ing level. We may therefore lump all of the superior levels into a single
unit which supplies information and a mission to the "overall weapons
system". We may also assume that the effect of reconnaissance informa-
tion is felt mainly at the operating level. We therefore have reduced
our "overall weapons system" to the single stage type shown in illustra-
tions 1 and 2. Actual "overall weapons systems" may have one or more
weapons and reconnaissance sub-systems. Only those with one of each type
sub-system will be considered here.
Overall weapons systems in practice will consist of:
(a) An officer in tactical command plus his staff as the decision
mechanism.
(b) Reconnaissance units, craft, or equipment as the reconnaissance
sub-system.
(c) Attack units, craft, or equipment as the weapons sub-system.
(d) A suitable collection of communications channels as the linking
communications net.
Illustration ^ tabulates several examples of "overall weapons systems"






















































































Once we have defined the inputs received through the broad arrow
of illustration 2, the average characteristics of the "overall weapons
system" are defined. We now have to devise a measure of effectiveness
before we can optimize the overall weapons system with respect to one or
all of its components. In this paper we are interested in optimizing the
"overall weapons system" with respect to its reconnaissance sub-system.
2. The elements of the simplest general problem
The simplest problem to analyze is one in which we initially have
the following inputs
:
(a) A single mission m which will
(1) Single out a particular class of target n as the sole type
9

to be operated on by the "overall weapons system".
(2) Specify a single optimization criterion (such as cost to
U.S. in time, materials, etc.) with respect to which the
"overall weapons system" operations on targets of class n
are to be optimized.
(b) A single weapons sub-system w about which all operational
characteristics are known.
(c) A single reconnaissance sub-system L about which all operational
characteristics are known.
(d) The characteristics of the target type n singled out by mission
m, including its density distribution in operating space, are
known.
The remaining input z_ is the mean position error for targets of
class n_ caused by time delays within the "overall weapons system" and
the characteristics of target class n. We may define z_ as the informa-
tion deterioration factor. It is important to note that z is a function
of time and target characteristics alone, and represents the degree of
deterioration of information due to target motion after the time of ob-
servation.
3. The measure of "overall weapons system" effectiveness
Suppose that mission m specified target n and dollar cost to the
United States as the optimization criterion for the "overall weapons
system"
•
Then we will use as our measure of effectiveness the following:
Probability of kill of target n by weapons
M.E. = Sub-system w with z information deterioration




M E = P K per action
$ Cost to U.S. per action
U. Kill Probability
The kill probability P„ per action can be derived in the following
steps
:
(a) Determine the time delay t^ in the "overall weapons system",
between the time of detection of the average target n by the
reconnaissance sub—system L and the time weapons sub-system w
can attack n.
(b) From time delay t^ and the characteristics of target n, de-
termine z.
(c) From the characteristics of w and n and the value of z deter-
mine a probability, Pc that weapon w will contact target n.
(d) From the characteristics of w and n determine a probability
^KIC that weaF>on w will kill n given a contact on n.
(e) PK , the probability of a kill of n by w. PK » Pric • ?c
5. Cost to the United States
The cost to the United States in whatever value units are specified
in the "overall weapons system" mission, is the sum of the costs of the
components of the "overall weapons system". These costs are:
(a) Cyt» cost of weapons sub-system per action consisting of
(1) Original cost of weapon, pro-rated per action.
(2) Cost of training, maintenance and special equipment pro-
rated per action.




(b) Cj/Nw , cost of reconnaissance sub-system action, per action of w,
(1) Cost of reconnaissance vehicle-medium pro-rated per recon-
naissance action, divided by Nwn , the reconnaissance ratio.
1/
This cost is not applicable if the reconnaissance sub-system
is carried by the same vehicle as is the weapons sub-system.
(2) Costs of training, special equipment, materials and main-
tenance pro-rated per action of reconnaissance sub-system,
divided by N/Wx, the reconnaissance ratio.
Li
(3) Costs of processing and interpreting reconnaissance informa-
tion computed as above.
(c) C^, cost of Decision Mechanism per action of w. Cost of maintain-
ing decisioner and staff pro-rated per action of weapons sub-
system.
6. Detailed measure of effectiveness
Expanding the measure of effectiveness in terms of the probabilities









Probability of a contact of n by w times Proba-
M.E. = bility of a kill of n by w per contact
Cost of (Weapons, Reconnaissance, Decision and
Communication) Sub-systems pro-rated per weapons
sub-system action
7. Use of the measure of effectiveness to determine the responses of
the "overall weapons system" to a given situation




P(KIC), Cw , Clf Cd Cc
Two values of P
c ,
the probability of contact, are of interest.
(a) P
c (iw) when carrying on reconnaissance at the optimum rate de-
termined by the reconnaissance ratio
„ . weapons sub-system action
L reconnaissance sub-system action
a constant in a given situation.
(b) P
c (w )
when no separate reconnaissance is carried on. This value
of Pc is a function of the weapons sub-system w and the target
density.
We can now calculate two values of the measure of effectiveness cor-
responding to the two basic alternative responses that can be made by the
decision mechanism
(a) Carry on reconnaissance and attack operations in the proper ratio.
(b) Garry on attack operations only.
ME (reconnaissance and attack) = c (Lw) • (KIC)




M.E. 'attack only) = c(w)» P(KIC)
Cw Cd Z Q
The maximum of these two values will determine the responses of the






Reconnaissance is the examination of land, sea and air space to
gather information concerning the enemy.
Reconnaissance vehicle mediums are vehicles equipped with one or





(e) land surface vehicles
(f) humans
Reconnaissance mediums are the physical means of absorbing informa-
tion into the "overall weapons system". A few mediums are:
(a) Human lookout using eyes or, eyes plus optics, to absorb in-
formation.
(b) Human photo interpreter using eyes or, eyes plus optical equip-
ment, to absorb information in images swept up by photographic
equipment
.
(c) Human radar operator, absorbing information in images swept up
by radar equipment.
(d) Human communications monitor, absorbing information from visual
and aural images swept up by communications receiving equipment.
(e) Human M.A.D. operator, absorbing information from visual images
14

swept up by M.A.D. equipment.
;f) Human E.C.M. operator, absorbing information from visual and aural
images swept up by E.C.X. equipment.
The reconnaissance medium will be thought of here as a combination
of the human and his equipment. Each reconnaissance medium is capable
of absorbing one or more classes of reconnaissance information.





In simplifying the reconnaissance problem, we will limit the defini-
tion of information to identification and location of objects. This limi-
tation is in accordance with our simplifying assumption that target char-
acteristics are given to the "overall weapons system" from higher echelons.
2. Sweep rate and reconnaissance ratio
Each reconnaissance medium has a sweep width W and each vehicle has
a sweep velocity V. In addition we are given the density ff-ryz) °^ tar-
gets in the operating space. The product of W • V • ;' (yryZ ) is the sweep
rate S, of the reconnaissance sub-system.
The sweep rate is an important characteristic of the reconnaissance
sub-system. It is this characteristic which in a particular operating
situation determines the reconnaissance ratio. This is done as follows:
(a) The sweep rate is determined as outlined in OEG 56* and appendix
of this paper.
(b) The time spent sweeping per reconnaissance sub-system action, t s ,
* OEG 56, Chapter 2.
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is determined from the characteristics of L and the given situa-
tion. Under certain conditions where the constraints on the recon-
naissance sub-system do not determine its action, the time spent
sweeping during each reconnaissance sub-system action may require
optimization. We may assume, however, that in a given "overall
weapons system" this time is a pre-determined system characteris-
tic.
(c) The sweep time per reconnaissance sub-system action is multi-
plied by the sweep rate to find targets located per reconnais-
sance sub-system action.
Targets = t s • Sl - NL
reconnaissance action
(d) From the characteristics of w and the given situation the aver-
age number of targets Nw, of class n which can be engaged per
weapons sub-system action is determined. This quantity is limited
by:
(1) The average number of targets within reach of w per action,
adjusted for the time required for each engagement.
(2) The average number of engagements of which w is capable
per action.
(3) A combination of 1 and 2. This number is determined for the
"overall weapons system" when a given situation is specified.
Now, computing the ratio Nw we have the reconnaissance ratio, Nw ,
the ratio of weapons sub-system actions to reconnaissance sub-system ac-
tions. This ratio is an optimum division of effort for the "overall
weapons system" and, as was pointed out in Chapter II, the response of
the decision mechanism will be actions of w and L in this ratio if
16

reconnaissance is warranted as determined by study of relative measures
of effectiveness.
3. Target Information Deterioration
The quality of target information is highest at the time that the
location and identity of a target in operating space is absorbed by a
reconnaissance medium. We can say that at this time the target is lo-
cated with certainty within the limits of reconnaissance medium resolv-
ing power.
If target n can have its position changed with time, the informa-
tion absorbed by the reconnaissance medium will deteriorate with time.
Consequently the probability Pc will also deteriorate with time, though
this deterioration will not commence until the target has moved so that
the uncertainty in its position is greater than the space in which Pc
would be unity for w.
If target n cannot be moved, the quality of information, in the
sense used here, does not deteriorate perceptibly during an operating
period of the "overall weapons system".
Military targets may have zero, one, two or three degrees of free-
dom. For example, a train is restricted to motion along a definite line
or in one dimension. A man on foot is restricted to movement in the
plane of the earth* s surface, or two dimensions. An aircraft may move in
three dimensional space though its movement in the third dimension is so
limited that a two dimensional model will suffice for most purposes.
Wheeled and tracked vehicles move in ways that may have one or two de-
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Locomotive is evenly distributed, within a locomotive length,
(resolving power) around (0) at time located P.
P







Locomotive is normally distributed about
Jul z 36 miles, cr = 27.7 miles 3 hours after time located
Illustration 5





Fixed installation targets such as buildings, emplacements and the
like have zero degrees of freedom. Once located they will remain fixed
as time passes.
In passing we may note that it is quite possible to think of quali-
tative changes in the target with time, the study of which should prove
of value in considerations of strategic reconnaissance.
4. Deterioration of target information quality with time, in one dimension
In this paper the random walk model of diffusion as described by
Feller* is used to approximate the motion of a moving target after de-
tection. This approximation is best when the probabilities of motion
forward and backward are nearly equal, when the velocity of the target
can take on any value up to its maximum with equal probability and when
the resulting probability distribution is used near its mean value.
Let us consider a one dimensional case. See illustration 5» A.
target moving with a velocity <xf - ——? in a straight line and a pro-
bability p of moving in one direction and (l - p) = q of moving in the
other direction will, after a time t^, be normally distributed about a
a.
mean, yW. = td (p-q) -==-^ = 2ctd with a variance C - Apqi^J t = 2Dtd
The drift constant c = g (p-q) -?r+ and the diffusion constant
42»
^ r
D = Apq/A *^ , are target characteristics which describe the target dis-
t;
tribution as a function of time.
5. Example of information deterioration
Suppose we are given the location, within a locomotive length, of
a locomotive headed east on a very long east-west railroad track. We
are told that the locomotive has a maximum velocity of 20 miles per hour
* Feller - Probability Theory and its Applications, Vol. I, p. 29A-5.
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and that the locomotive will move ahead with probability (.8) and back-
ward with probability (.2). What is the probability distribution of the
locomotive f s position after three hours?
After three hours
/U - 3 hours (.8 - .2) 20 idles = 36 miles in direction of greatest
hour
probability.
cr- = /,(.£)(. 2) • 3 hours x hOO JiiiSS. = 768 (miles)
£T - 768 =27.7 miles
The form of the distribution is shown in illustration 5.
6. Deterioration of target information with time in two dimensions
The bivariate normal distribution will serve as the model of target
dispersion with time, in two dimensional space. This distribution may be
calculated using one dimensional normal distributions along an x and y
axis as marginal distributions of the desired bivariate distribution.
7. Deterioration time in the "overall weapons system".
Since time delays play such an important part in determining the
deterioration of target information, we will now look at the "overall
weapons system" to determine their source. Later, when optimizing the
"overall weapons system" with respect to any of its components, the reduc-
tion of the time delays associated with the component will be of major
importance. The delays by sub- system are:
(a) Reconnaissance sub-system (see illustration 6)
(l) t s , average time spent sweeping after a target is found,
or, time lost before the average piece of target informa-
tion is put into the communications channel from the recon-





(2) t r , average time spent by the reconnaissance vehicle-medium
returning to the location of the information processing com-
ponent, or, average time each piece of target information
spends in the communications channel between the reconnais-
sance vehicle-medium and the information processing com-
ponent •
(3) t , average time spent by each piece of target information
in the information processing component.
(U) t^, average time spent in the interpretation component by
each piece of target information.
(5) t , average time spent by each piece of information in the
communication channels between the information processing
component and the decision mechanism.
(b) Decision Mechanism
(1) t c , average time spent by decision mechanism deciding on
action to be taken on each piece of target information re-
ceived.
(2) t , average time spent phrasing and transmitting orders to
the weapons sub-system.
(c) Weapons sub-system
(1) t,, average time spent preparing to act.





OPTIMIZING THE "OVERALL 'WEAPONS SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO
ITS RECONNAISSANCE SUB-SYSTEM
1. The effect of variation of z, on the kill probability PK .






Let us assume that for our given situation equation 1 gives the maxi-
mum value. We now wish to optimize the "overall weapons system" with re-
spect to its reconnaissance sub-system. This in effect allows us to
vary C, and N/- - i .
First we will see how P^ varies with changes in P^ = P(vtq) * ^fc)
P
c ,
the probability of a contact by w on n, is the only factor in
the kill probability that is a function of the reconnaissance sub-system.
Consequently it is the only factor in P^ we can vary in this optimization
process.
Let us plot P
c
vs. Z (see illustration 7(a). For Z = 0, P
c
is a
maximum, and as Z increases P
c
decreases monotonically, approaching a
constant asymptotically.
Since FVir-rpN is a constant for a given n and w; a plot of P^ vs. Z
is proportional to that of Pc vs. Z. For PK j C * 1 the two plots will be
the same. For PKIG ^ 1 the plot of P„ vs. Z will be everywhere less
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In our model of the distribution of a moving target with time the
deterioration, which we have previously denoted by Z, may be measured
in terms of (j~~
,
the standard deviation. Consequently we may replace
the absaissa Z by &Z •
P
c
itself is the product of two probabilities.
(a) Pf the probability that w will find n if it passes near it.




= Pf . Ps
Ps here is the integral over a portion of a normal distribution hav-
ing 0"T = 21)^ where t^ is the time delay in the "overall weapons system",
Since the decision mechanism can calculate the mean position of n, we can
credit w with searching equally on each side of the mean target position;
, ( " i.
then Pc at any time, t is——— i ~*5 J , where A w is the mean dis-s xr<n,\e^ 4 -<
tance w can search for n. ^ _ A«^
?f is independent of Z and therefore Pc and consequently P^ can be
represented by a function proportional to Pg . A plot of Pk vs. Z will
be proportional to a plot of Pc vs. t^ where each ordinate represents
an integration of a different normal distribution.
2. The effect of variation of Z on the C^, the cost of the reconnais-
sance sub-system
We have stated in the last section that Z is proportional to time
delay. Therefore we are actually interested now in a function of cost
of reconnaissance sub-system versus time delay. Or to restate the prob-
lem, what does it cost to decrease time delay when we are limited to
changes in the reconnaissance sub-system only.
2U

This function of cost versus t may be .obtained empirically, as
follows
:
(a) Prepare a detailed listing of the time delays within the recon-
naissance sub-system as was done in Chapter III.
(b) Place this list in one to one correspondence with the components
of physical equipment or organizations making up the reconnais-
sance sub-system.
(c) Derive an expression for the time delay in each component of
the reconnaissance sub-system in terms of its important physi-
cal characteristics such as speed, processing rate, etc.
(d) Devise methods of changing each of the characteristics, which
affect individual time delays, in steps such that the time de-
lay is reduced a certain percent. The percent reduction steps
can be chosen to give desired accuracy.
(e) Calculate the cumulative cost for each time reduction step.
(f) Derive an expression for the sweep rate of the reconnaissance
sub-system in terms of its physical characteristics.
(g) Devise a method of calculating sweep rate for each reconnaissance
sub-system produced.
(h) Now arrange the material prepared in the above steps (a through
g),,in a table with columns for sweep rate cost and deteriora-
tion time, (See illustration 8), versus % deterioration time de-
crease steps. Within the boxes in the table place,
(1) In the sweep rate column the values of sweep rate.
(2) In the deterioration time columns the original and improved




{i) Now make all possible combinations choosing one element from
each column,
(j) For each combination calculate the cost, compute the total de-
terioration time and the sweep rate,
(k) Compute the reconnaissance ratio of each combination from sweep
rate and system constants as in Chapter III, section 2d.
(1) Divide each combination cost by its own reconnaissance ratio,
(m) Now set up a time delay axis
m
on which time class intervals are
marked,
(n) Arrange the combination costs (adjusted for reconnaissance
ratio) , as ordinates in time classes corresponding to total
deterioration,
(o) Now draw a step graph through the lowest ordinate in each time
box. See illustration 9.
The function portrayed by the step graph is cost vs. time delay.
3. Determination of the optimal reconnaissance sub-system
Now having a function of Pj( versus deterioration time and a func-
tion of cost versus deterioration time we can readily determine a func-
tion of "overall weapons system" effectiveness versus deterioration time.
By dividing values of Pv by cost we have a reasonable measure of "over-
all weapons system" effectiveness which can be plotted as a function of
deterioration time. See illustration 10.
»
This measure of effectiveness will have a maximum at some value of
ti . The reconnaissance sub-system corresponding to this value of






1. General methods developed using the Fast Carrier Task Force as an
example of an "overall weapons system".
The rigorous use of an optimization method such as the one developed
in this paper requires extensive labor and the availability of considera-
ble technical information as to cost, characteristics and feasibility of
equipment and human organization. Therefore the preparation of an il-
lustrative example even in a field with which the writer is quite famil-
iar calls for the use of broa T powers of simplification and estimation
by the writer. In addition it has proved impossible to use much of the
factual information available because of security classification of this
paper.
2. The detailed composition of a Fast Carrier Task Force
A Fast Carrier Task Force when simplified and thought of as an "over-
all weapons system" can be divided into sub-systems and components as
follows
:
a. Reconnaissance sub-system - Photo reconnaissance system
(1) Reconnaissance vehicle medium - (Photo aircraft)
(2) Communications link between reconnaissance vehicle - medium
and information processing component - (human runners).
(3) Information processing component - (Photographic laboratory)
(k) Communications link between information processing component
and information interpreting component - (human runners).





(6) Coramunications link between information interpretation com-
ponent and decision mechanism - (human runners).
b. Decision mechanism - (Task force staff, operation officer and
Task force commander)
.
(1) Calculation of optimum and other responses from intelligence -
(Operations department).
(2) Transmission of optimum responses to decisioner - (human
runner - visual or aural message).
(3) Decisioner - choice of responses - (human).
(4) Transmission link for responses chosen by decisioner to the
weapons sub-system - (human runner - written message - visual
message - radio message).
c. Weapons sub-system - (Attack aircraft)
(1) Preparation of weapons sub-system for action - (briefing -
arming, etc.).
(2) Proceeding to target - (flying time).
3. The "overall weapons system" inputs.
We will assume that we are given a Fast Carrier task force that is in
a steady state combat operation. The inputs to the "overall weapoks sys-
tem" are fixed. Suppose we have as in illustration 2:
a. Mission m, see illustration 2.
(1) Operate continuously in area A which is approximately 174
miles off the coast line of enemy.
(2) Destroy supply vehicles (n) moving along coastal supply
route R from the boundary of a non-active power to a front




Probability of Contact Pc vs. Information Deterioration Z
P<£ PK for all Z
Illustration 7(b)







(3) Maximize the kills of supply vehicles (n) while minimizing
the dollar cost of operations.
b. Weapons sub-system characteristics w - attack aircraft
(1) Range - 200 miles
(2) Velocity - 250 miles per hour
(3) Search - Capable of searching a 20 mile segment of R with
probability l.of finding anything on the segment .k
(h) Kill - Capable of killing any target n found, with proba-
bility 1
(5) Briefing and readying time - 15 minutes.
(6) Cost of w per sortie, $2,000.
(7) Pro rata costs per mission of w $13,000.
c. Reconnaissance sub-system - (Photo reconnaissance) characteristics
(1) Reconnaissance vehicle-medium (Photo aircraft).
(a) Range-600 miles, 200 spent sweeping.
(b) Velocity-A.00 miles per hour
(c) Sweep rate - two objects per hour (we have assumed that
the sweeping is perfect).
(d) Cost of Photo aircraft, $1,500 per mission.
(e) Pro rata costs per mission, $5,000.
(f) Altitude to sweep target n, with certainty is, 7000 1 .
(2) Communications link between vehicle-medium and information
processing component - human runner requires 5 minutes to
deliver film from aircraft on carrier flight deck to photo-
graphic laboratory.
(3) Information processing component - Shipboard photographic
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laboratory overall processing rate .25 Sp^ — time from raw
negative to finished print. Pro rata costs in laboratory
per reconnaissance mission, $500.
(U) Communications link between Information processing component
and Information interpreting component - human runner requir-
ing 5 minutes to deliver photographic prints from laboratory
to interpretation office.
(5) Information interpretation component - Photographic inter-
preter, Interpretation rate ^ ^ n - average time to locate
target on photograph, calculate mean advance position of tar-
get, and delineate the search sector for one attack aircraft
W. Pro rata cost of Interpretation, $100 per mission.
(6) Communications link between Information interpretation com-
ponent and decision mechanism - human runners requiring 5
-minutes to deliver interpretation reports from interpreta-
tion office to decisioner.
d. Time delays in decision mechanism.
(1) 10 minutes to calculate response and transmit to decisioner.
(2) 5 minutes to choose responses, phrase orders and transmit to
weapons system.
e. Characteristics of target n.
(1) Kay. velocity 20 miles per hour.
(2) Probability that n will continue to move in direction headed
when detected .P - .8 in opposite direction q .2
(3) Length of vehicle 20
»
U) Probability that n will be killed by w if found = 1,




4. Calculation of total deterioration time of average operation.
From the situation and "overall weapons system" characteristics we
will now calculate the deterioration time tj.
a. t q average time spent sweeping after a target is found.
t =
1 mean length of photo sweep
s z photo aircraft velocity
v . !
200 miles
. ^ rt s - £ —t?——
—




average time spent by photo aircraft returning from sweep.
mean distance of photo aircraft from
r





2Q0 mi J-P9 r
.5 hours
400 miles/hour
c. t average time spent processing each piece of target information,
Since film is processed in a complete roll all information must
wait for complete process to be completed.
t = processing time # mean length of photo sweep
P foot £ ground gained miles
forward/exposure photo foot
t = f.?5^ minutes . 209 milep = 96 min =1.6 hours
P foot (.4)* 1.3 ^ies
foot
d. tj_ average time spent by each, piece of target information in
the interpretation component. Since each target is immediately
reported to the decision mechanism the mean t^ is ^ of the total
time spent interpreting per sortie.
. i interpretation time
# film len^ hi K foot
.
_ i 1 minute 200 milesH " z foot (*L) « 1.1 miles
foot
t. = 192 min * 3.2 hours.
e. tq average time spent by each piece of information in communica-
tion channels within the reconnaissance sub-system.
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t = aircraft to lab lab to interpreter interpreter to decision
mechanism
tg = 5 min. -h 5 min. + 5 min. = 15 min. = .25 hours
f. t c average time spent computing optimum response
t
c
* 10 minutes = .17 hours
g. tQ average time spent phrasing and transmitting orders to de-
cision mechanism.
t Q = 5 minutes = .08 hours
h. t^ average time spent briefing and readying w
t^ = 15 minutes = .25 hours
i. t
a
average time spent flying to target
t =
average distance to search sector •*" ? sector length
a (attack aircraft velocity)
t_ = 174 f 10 miles - .7^ hours
250 fr.il es
tjours
The total time deterioration is the sum of all the above factors.
t , - 7.05 hours or o- 7 hours
d
5. Calculation of reconnaissance ratio
a. Sweep rate and targets per photo reconnaissance sortie.





reconnaissance sortie sweeps 200 miles of road we caVi calculate
targets per reconnaissance sortie.
N = targets swept , miles sweptL —- sortie
mile
NL .005
• 200 = 1 target found
reconnaissance sortie
b. Nw is given as one target per attack aircraft sortie.
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The reconnaissance ratio is then
H = X" = l
This means that one sortie of a photo plane is needed per sortie
of an attack plane.
6. Calculation of target distribution.
We have been given that for n
P .8
q .2 v = 20 mph
We have calculated that t^ = 7 hours.
At the end of t^ the target n found in tjne reconnaissance sweep
will be normally distributed with
M = 36 miles
O- =27.7 miles
as in the example of Chapter 3»
7. Calculation of PK
We have been given that P](I3 = 1
Therefore since Pj< = Pc • Pkjq P% = Pc
We have also known that Pc = 1, if w happen? to search where n is
actually located. Since W can sweep only 20 miles of road and since the
decision mechanism knows the mean position of target at all times we can
expect W to search from ten miles ahead to ten miles behind the expected
mean position of n. ' /
Therefore: r s±j- _,.*




If we did not conduct reconnaissance, n would be eqi, likely to be
cated anywhere along the full 200 miles searched at any time. Therefore,
P = 20 miles
^ 200 miles
P. Calculation of costs.
= .1 • PK
a. Jw cost of attack aircraft per sortie.
Cw - dollar cost of attack aircraft per sortie.
prorated cost of training, upkeep, armament, etc. per sc:
Cw = $2000 -f Si , = $12,000
b. j cost of reconnaissance sub-system per sortie.
C| = dollar cost of reconnaissance aircraft per sortie.
pro rated cost of training, upkeep, etc. per reconnaissance
aircraft per sortie
pro rated cost of processing per sortie
pro rated cost of interpreting per sortie
C^ = $1500 i $5000 *- $500 + $100
C, $7100
c. C^ cost of decision
Cd = $100




9. Calculation of measure of effectiveness and "overall weapons system"
responses.
PK
ME * Kax 'Jw ^. Cr/yw _ C^ 4- Z with reconnaissance




-4-: — = 1.03 x 10"^ kills reconnaissance
ME = M»x^,300 %
i jl _ no t/n-5 kills[~T - .82 x 10 y —r no reconnaissance
> $12,200 $
The decision mechanism will choose to send out one photo reconnais-
sance sortie per attack sortie under these conditions. Letting Pv vary
ft.
we can see that when Pc (Lw) ~* .158 decisioner will no longer reconnoiter
for targets n since the attack aircraft can do as good a job by itself.
Letting G, vary, decisioner will no longer reconnoiter for targets n
when total cost "H $24,400.















20Q = 1.64 x
10~5 H no reconnaissance
Now the decisioner will decide to send attack aircraft to search the
route without prior reconnaissance.
Suppose that with Nw still equal to 2 we were to cut the "overall wea-
L











.2 - 1 /, „ m""5 kills .
V, p 20Q " —ft— no reconna Usance
Here again it is slightly profitable to carry on reconnaissance.
We may conclude then that it is only marginally profitable to conduct
reconnaissance for targets of type n under conditions of this problem.
If the target density increases reconnaissance becomes unprofitable. If
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the "overall weapons system" time delays are reduced reconnaissance be-
comes more profitable.
10. Optimizing the photo-reconnaissance attack aircraft "overall weapons
stem"
a. Calculation of the function P^ versus time.
We have shown earlier in this chapter that under the assumptions
' r"* - jmade in this example Pv = ?n ~-r—~'*-~ \ /> C~Z-i~ a. <
- IJ
b. Calculating values of C" for increasing values of t^ and making
the above integration we can plot a graph of Pj( versus t. See il-
lustration 10.
b. Calculation of the function C^ versus time.
Using the technique described in Chapter IV plot the step function
C^ versus t. See illustration 9.
c. Determination of optimum t . from K.E. versus t^
Divide the function Pj^ versus t by the function of C total cost
versus t. The resulting function is M.E. versus b and its maximum
will indicate the optimum t^ for the "overall weapons system". See
illustration 11.
d. Determination of optimum reconnaissance sub-system from t^ and C,
versus t^.
The optimum reconnaissance sub-system is that prescribed by the
component combination described by the value of Ct versus t^ at the
value of t^ giving maximum effectiveness. In our example the op-
timum value of t . is .96 hours and the optimum component combina-
tion leading to this tj is (anoh) from Table 8b.
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Table for Computation of Sub-System
Component Improvement Costs
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Table of combinations with associated time delay
Cost and Reconnaissance Ratio
No Comb td $C Mg No Comb td
1* 49 ebed 5.55
CI Nw No Comb td C N
1 abed 6.P 2150 8150 i
'
- 97 ibed 5.30 78,650
5.21 75,700 12 abch 5 71 2200 . 50 ebch 5.46 8200 98 ibch
3 abel 5.63 2600 51 ebel 5.38 8500 | 99 ibel 5.13 76,100
4 abgd 4. 73 2550 52 ebgd 4.48 8550 4t 100 ibgd 4.23 76,C50
5 abgh 4. 64 2600
.
53 ebgh 4.39 8600 101 ibgh Always greater
6 ab*l 4.56 3000 v 54 ebgl 4.31 9000 102 ibgl than other
7 abkd 3.67 4050 55 ebvd 3.42 10050 103 ibkd values
8 abkh 3.58 4100 56 ebkh 3.33 10100 104 ibkh already cal-
9 abkl 3.5 4500 57 ebkl 3.25 10500 105 ibkl culated
10 abod 2.65 7050 58 ebod 2.40 13050 106 ibod
11 aboh 2.56 7100 59 eboh 2.31 13100 107 iboh
12 abol 2.48 7500 60 ebol 2.23 13500 108 ibol \
13 afed 5.27 2650 61 efed 5.02 8650 109 ifed
14 afch 5.18 2700 62 efch 4.93 8700 110 ifch
15 afel 5.1 3100 63 efel 4.85 9100 111 ifel
16 afgd 4.2 3050 64 efgd 3.95 9050 112 ifgd
17 afgh 4.11 3100 65 efgh 3.86 9100 113 ifgh
18 afgl 4.04 3500 66 efgl 3.78 9500 114 ifgl
19 afkd 3.14 4550 67 efkd 2.89 10550 115 ifkd
20 afkh 3.05 46OO 68 efkh 2.80 10600 116 ifkh
21 afkl 2.97 5000 69 efkl 2.72 11000 117 ifkl
22 afod 2.12 7550 70 efod 1.87 13550 118 ifod
23 afoh 2.03 7600 71 efoh 1.78 13600 119 ifoh
24 afol 1.95 8000 72 efol 1.70 14000 120 ifol
25 ajed 4.73 4650 73 ejed 3.48 10650 121 ifed -
26 ajch 4.64 4700 74 ejeh 3.39 10700 122 ijch
27 ajcl 4.56 5100 75 ejcl 3.32 11100 123 ijcl
28 ajgd 3.66 5050 76 ejgd 3.
a
11050 124 ijgd
29 ajgh 3.57 5100 77 ejgh 3.32 11100 125 ijgh
30 ajgl 3.49 5500 78 ejgl 3.24 11500 126 ijgl
31 ajkd 2.6 6550 79 ejkd 2.35 12550 127 ijkd
32 ajkh 2.51 6700 80 ejkh 2.26 12600 128 ijkh
33 ajkl 2.43 7000 81 ejkl 2.18 13000 129 ijkl
34 ajod 1.58 9550 82 ejod 1.33 15550 130 ijod
35 ajoh 1.49 9600 83 ejoh 1.24 15600 131 ijoh
36 ajol 1.41 10000 84 ejol 1.16 16000 132 ijol
37 ancd 4.2 7650 85 encd 3.95 3 133 incd
38 anch 4.11 7700 86 ench 3.86 13700 134 inch
39 ancl 0.03 8100 87 encl 3.78 14100 135 incl
40 angd 3.13 8050 88 engd 2.88 14050 136 ingd
41 angh 3.04 8100 89 engh 2.79 14100 137 ingh
42 angl 2.96 8500 90 engl 2.71 14500 138 ingl
43 ankd 2.07 9550 91 enkd 1.82 15550 139 inkd
44 ankh 1.98 9600 92 enkh 1.73 15600 140 inkh
45 ankl 1.90 10000 93 enkl 1.65 16000 141 inkl
46 anod 1.05 12550 94 enod .80 18550 142 inod .55 80050
47 anoh .96 12600 95 enoh .71 18600 143 inoh .46 80100


















Interval Comb. td *VNL
- .2
J
.2 -.4 144 .38 80,500
.U -.6 142 .55 80,050
.6 -.8 94 .80 18,550
.••
-1.0 47 .96 12,600
1.0-1.2 46 1.05 12,550
1.4-1.6 34 1.58 9,550
1.8-2.0 24 1.95 8,000
2.0-2.2 22 2.12
j 7,550
2.2-2.6 32 2.51 6,700
2.6-2.8
j




3.0-3.2 19 3.14 h, 550
3.2-3.6 I 8 3.58 r 4,100
3.6-3.0 ] 7 3.67 4,050
3.8-4.2 16 4.2 3,050
4.2-4.6 6 4.56 3,000
4.6-4.8






















Kill proLa.bil /'fy /s ^W
°i = 20 m^-^-e9
hour








K(n/wZ )ME x 10" 5 Comb. No.
.38 80,500 97,650 .76 0.78xl0" 5 144
.55 80,050 97,200 .68 0.7 xlO-5 142
.80 18,550 35,700 .58 1.63x10-5 96
.96 12,600 29,750 .53 1.79x10-5 anoh 47
1.05 12,550 29,700 .51 1.73x10-5 46
1.58 9,550 26,700 .43 1.61x10-5 34
1.95 8,000 25,150 .40 1.59x10-5 24
2.12 7,550 24,700 .38 1.535x10-5 22
2.51 6,700 23,850 .35 1.465x10-5 32
2.6 6,550 23,700 .34 1.43 xl0-5 31
2.97 5,000 22,150 .32 1.445x10-5 21
3.H 4,550 21,700 .31 1.43 xlO-5 19
3.58 4,100
; 21,250 .295 1.39 xlO-5 8
3.67 4,050
1 21,200 .290 1.36 xlO-5 7
4.2 3,050 20,200 .270 1.34 xlO-5 16
4. 56 3,000 20,150 .260 1.28 xlO-5
j
6
4.73 2,550 19,700 .250 1.27 xlO-5
j
4
5.71 2,200 19,350 .230 1.14 xlO-5 2
6.80 2,150 19,300
— .J













1. Tactical uses of "overall weapons system" model
For various real operational situations this model could be used by a
commander to determine which of a number of target classes (n, , n2 . . n«)
of relative values (V,, V-j . . V ) specified in a mission affords the best
payoff for each of the various "overall weapons systems" formable from sub-
systems available.
We can also determine the conditions on each of (n, , n^ . . n) for
which a given "overall weapons systems" telescopes, i.e., reverts to no
reconnaissance. This occurs when the measure of effectiveness with recon-
naissance is less than that without reconnaissance.
2. Strategic uses of "overall weapons system" model
The model may be used for calculation of optimal "overall weapons sys-
. tern" characteristics vd.th respect to
a. Reconnaissance sub system (L,, L^ . »L.t)
b. Weapons sub system (w^, W2 . . w)
c. Target class (n^ . . . n^)
d. Mission (m^, m^ . . m )
e. Any combination of the above.
Such calculations may lead to:
(1) Development of new sub-system or sub-system components.
(2) Re-combination of existing sub-systems and reassignment of tar-
gets and missions. •
(3) Redistribution of forces to place "overall weapons systems" in
U3

areas where targets for which they are optimal are most
abundant
.
(U) Restatement of missions so that national objectives may be




1. Boston University Optical Research Laboratory—Technical Notes 85 and
109.
2. Feller - Probability Theory and its Applications.
3. Greenleaf - Photographic Optics.





1. General discussion of sweep rate.
Every reconnaissance vehicle-medium will have an information sweep
rate in targets/unit time. This rate St depends on:
a. The length of path covered by the vehicle per unit time, V,.
b. The sweep width of the reconnaissance medium, W* which is a func-
tion of the following:
(1) The size, usable area, strength reflectance, or other target
characteristic chosen to fit the reconnaissance medium.
(2) The capacity of the reconnaissance medium.
(3) The ratio of signal level to background level of the target,
i.e., contrast, signal to noise ratio, etc.
c. The distribution of the target n versus size and signal to back-
ground ratio.
2. Air reconnaissance mediums.
From the morphologic Diagram of Airborne Reconnaissance (see illustra-
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h. Communications monitoring gear,
i. Counter measure detection and monitoring.
J. Magnetic Airborne detection and airborne scintillation detection.
*k. Pathfinding and beacon planting.
1. Weather instruments.
*m. Shadowing and tracking.
.
*n. Early warning.
*o. Early early warning.
All of these reconnaissance media except those marked * have sweep
widths. These specialized (*) media of airborne reconnaissance must be
evaluated by other means. Sweep width for visual radar and electronic
mediums has been investigated to a considerable degree and extensive
literature is available for the calculation of sweep rates of "overall
weapons systems" utilizing these mediums. Since we are using the photo-
graphic reconnaissance example it is desirable to develop sweep rate using
this medium.
3. Sweep rate of reconnaissance sub-system using photographic aircraft,
a. Rjnax* Maximum airdistance to target.
The Optical Research Laboratory of Boston University ' has shown
that the differential threshold of target detectibility on a photograph
A If




-where jr^ r intensity of target surrounding on film
A-L-f- difference in intensity between target and target sur-
roundings on film
G and K - constants of the reconnaissance sub-system.
** Boston University Technical Notes P5, 109.
46

P Perimeter of the target.
UA = Useful area of the target defined as the area within 1.5
minutes from target edge.
If we have a fairly regular target, which is usually the case, the
useful area is related to Pf , the target perimeter on the film, in a sim-
ple way. UA £^ pf . f . 43.63 x 10-5 c_ t
Pf , the perimeter on the film is related to Pa , the perimeter of the ob-
ject on the ground as follows:
^max
where f - focal length of camera
R
max maximum air distance to target.
—J
,




the actual differential threshold of target de-
tectability on the ground as follows:
where is the attenuation coefficient and Rmax the air distance to the
target.
Using the above relations we can now find a transcendental equation
f0r R
max
t0 achieve detection and recognition of a target on film when we
know actual size and shape and the minimum value of A
,j-'.ft for the tar-
get and its background. We must also know the constants C and K.
~ e = C P* I ) . £ -J - f - 43,4?^
-^ K R J ft
For a given situation then, a maximum value of R will satisfy this
equation. For this Rmx and any smaller value of R, all targets with the
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characteristics given above will be detected by the reconnaissance sub-
system. Here we think of the reconnaissance sub-system as including photo
aircraft, processing and interpretation facilities, as in Illustration li*.
b. Day photo sweep width.
Let us consider that we have a photographic aircraft with an array
of cameras which allow adjustment of coverage angle, (see illus-
tration 15)
.
h = flying altitude
R^x = air distance to extreme of coverage




During daylight, illumination of the target and its surroundings
is not limiting. Modern cameras with good image motion compensation
devices allow exposure times sufficient to insure optimum exposure
time. Automatic exposure control devices will, in the future, insure
that the optimum exposure time is known.
To determine sweep width the value of R is calculated as in
max
part (a).
Then h = Rjnax 3 ^-n °^ and W = 2 R^x cos <y^
c. Day photo sweep rate.
Spr , sweep rate for photo reconnaissance is the product of
Hip* sweep width for day photography V, the aircraft velocity,
r
n
(x,yz) the target density, and t g , the time of sweep.
V = Wdp-V.f n<x,y,,).t s = i?g|t3
d. Night photographic reconnaissance sweep width.













































be calculated may be limited in one of two ways. It may be limited
by the target contrast and perimeter as in the daylight case if
illumination is sufficient or by illumination of the target area.
Both limiting conditions may be characterized by values of
R]nax of which the minimum will be the value used in the computa-
tion of Wnp , night photographic sweep width.
Let us consider that we have a photographic aircraft flying
as in Illustration 16.
We first define the following factors*:
h = flying altitude
R = air distance to extreme of coverage
max °
C**- = dip angle of coverage
1 = coverage angle
L3
= strength of source in candles
required film exposure in meter candle seconds2 =
2
.
= Et — En t = E te = g
E = illuminance on emulsion in meter candles
t « length of time shutter is open
t = nt effective exposure time
n = optical efficiency of shutter
B s luminance of object in candlesper
*y = transmittance of lense
F - f number of lense stop
S = A S A exposure index of emulsion
We now proceed as follows:
(l) Calculate B, luminance of target produced by source L .
3










B = -|- luminance in candles/m2
(2) Calculate illuminance on emulsion from target meter candles
ft B T ~ If Ls^J^ HH&terQ.cKV\clles
(3) Calculate requirer film exposure
(4) Solving for t and substituting
t - £ - - 4 F l R\*K_




Now we have a value of R_a X in terms of t , the time the
camera shutter is open; L^ the illumination source strength and
other system characteristics. By increasing tQ or Ls we can
increase Rmax # ^ decreasing F we can al3o increase R.
Each of these factors has a limit beyond which it cannot be increased
or cannot economically be increased, t is limited by the image motion
compensation mechanism. If >«• is the velocity of a target image on the
camera plate, a function of aircraft speed and focal length, and A p
is the travel of the image motion compensation mechanism then
Max t - T^T
Lg is limited by the size and energy requirements of light sources
of increasing size. Practical limits are reached at some maximum Lg .
F is limited by the lens itself, the value of \&x can be increased by
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decreasing F until the entire lens is transmitting light.
The value of R^x computed here may be greater or less than R_ax as
determined for the daylight case.





(night) UW from Part d
then W
nightphoto = 2 Rmax cos <*-
( night;
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